INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Kohlberg and Mertens proposed to study mappings that assign to each normal form game a collection of closed, nonempty sets of strategy profiles. They called such a mapping a solution. Furthermore they formulated a number of properties such a solution should satisfy. One of these properties, in¨ariance, plays a central role in this paper. Roughly speaking, a solution is invariant if the solution sets of a game do not change when the game is reduced. In this paper two ways of reducing a game are considered. The first way of reducing a game is eliminating iteratively pure Ž . strategies that are payoff equivalent with some possibly mixed strategy. When this method is applied to a normal form game, the result is again a normal form game. The second, more rigorous reduction method involves the identification of payoff-equivalent strategies for any player of a game irrespective of the question of whether the strategies identified were pure or not. In general, the result of this type of reduction is not a normal form game but a game in strategic form: the strategy spaces are polytopes, not Ž . necessarily simplices even when we started with a normal form game . Thus we are forced to extend the concept of a solution to strategic form games.
In fact the two ways of reducing a game described above generate two Ž . types of invariance: a relatively simple one for solutions over normal Ž . form games and a more complex one for solutions over strategic form games. However, the solutions introduced in the literature are usually defined for normal form games only. Sometimes it is not clear how to extend the given definition to the larger class of strategic form games.
In this paper we will show that an invariant solution for normal form games can be extended uniquely to an invariant solution for strategic form Ž games. This implies that the more complex form of invariance over . strategic form games can be checked directly by investigating the simple Ž . form of invariance over normal form games .
Ž . Note that this also solves the problem of extending the definition of an invariant solution for normal form games to the class of strategic form games: there is only one way to do the job.
In order to formalize some of the foregoing concepts, we make use of Ž .Ž the following methodᎏintroduced by Mertens 1987 see also van Damme, . Ž . 1996 ᎏto describe a reduction of a strategic form game. He identifies ² :
X ² : two strategic form games ⌫ s P,¨and ⌫ s Q, w if for any i there exists an affine and surjective mapping f : P ª Q such that¨s w ( f.
We will call a solution weakly in¨ariant if the solution sets of the game ⌫ X are precisely the images under f of the solution sets of the game ⌫. A solution is called in¨ariant if moreover the preimage of any solution set S of the game ⌫ X is the union of solution sets of the game ⌫ X whose images under f are S.
In Section 2, we define normal form games and strategic form games. In Section 3, Mertens' method of identifying two strategic form games is Ž . described. In Section 4, the weak invariance of a solution is defined. Ž . Furthermore our main result is proved. In the last section, the weak invariance of solutions for normal form games is considered. We show that one game is a reduction of another game if and only if the first game arises from the other by adding convex combinations of pure strategies as new pure strategies. Ä 4 n Notation. For n g ‫ގ‬ [ 1, 2, . . . , ‫ޒ‬ is the vector space of n-tuples of Ž . real numbers. If T is a finite set, ⌬ T is the set of probability distributions Ž . on T. The kernel of a linear map A is denoted by Ker A . For a convex Ž . set C, ext C is the set of extreme points of C. 
GAMES IN STRATEGIC AND NORMAL FORM
The first way to reduce a normal form game is by eliminating pure Ž . strategies that are payoff equivalent with some possibly mixed strategy of the same player. The result of this reduction is again a normal form game.
The second way of reducing a game is based on the identification of arbitrary payoff-equivalent strategies. In order to show that this type of Ž . reduction may lead to a game in strategic not necessarily normal form we Ž . note that the payoff-equivalence relation on ⌬ M can be extended to an
where u z N и is the linear mapping t ¬ u z N t on ‫ޒ‬ .
If we introduce the linear subspace equivalence classes containing at least one strategy of player i can be identified with a subset of this Euclidean space. Since, for a strategy
x sÝ x e of player i e is the vector in ⌬ M for which the kth
this set of equivalence classes can be identified with a polytope, say P , in a i Euclidean space. Finally, if we define for all i
Ž .
we obtain a game of the form P,¨, where P s Ł P . Hence, the game i i that arises if for each player all payoff-equivalent strategies are identified is a game in strategic form. The following example shows that this reduction does not necessarily lead to a normal form game. EXAMPLE 1. For the 2 = 4-bimatrix game
the subspace L can be found as follows. Since two different pure strategies of player 2 are apparently not payoff equivalent, the strategy space P can be identified with a quadrangle. . also van Damme, 1996 of identifying two strategic form games. In the next Ž . section, this method plays an important role in defining the weak invariance of a solution for strategic form games. Furthermore we construct for each strategic form game a normal form game that can be identified with the original strategic form game.
Ž . First we will motivate Mertens' definition of reducing strategic form games. To that purpose we reconsider the second reduction method in the previous section. Corresponding to this way of reducing a game ⌫, we Ž . consider the mapping f : ⌬ M ª P defined by
Then f is affine and surjective. Furthermore,
. . , f . Apparently, the relation be-
tween a game and its reduced strategic form can be described by means of a mapping f as defined before. This leads to the following definition.
with for all i Ž . 1 f : P ª Q is affine and surjective
In this situation we write ⌫ ª ⌫ X and call f a reduction map from ⌫ onto
In Section 5 we will show that this definition restricted to normal form Ž games is equivalent with the elimination of pure strategies that are payoff . equivalent with other strategies .
When all f are not only surjective but also injective, we have both
In that case we will call f an isomorphism f f between ⌫ and ⌫ X and say that ⌫ and ⌫ X are isomorphic.
² : 
Since f is surjective for all j, this is equivalent with
This shows that f preserves payoff equivalence, i.e., x is payoff equiva- 
is a reduction map from ⌫ onto ⌫. 
if ⌫ ª ⌫ X and f is an isomorphism, we may speak of the normal form f extension of a game. For later purposes we will show that the game ⌫ X is a reduction of the norm game ⌫ if the game ⌫ X is a reduction of the game ⌫. Therefore we norm need the following result.
² :
We will show that there exists a p g ext P without loss of generality, we may write L s M j K for some finite set
X is surjective, we can find for all k g K a strategy
with the properties as mentioned in the norm norm theorem. B
INVARIANT EXTENSIONS OF SOLUTIONS
Mertens and van Damme call a solution for strategic form games invariant if two requirements concerning the relation between the solution sets of a game and its reductions are satisfied. Since several solutions only satisfy the first of these requirements, we prefer to call such solutions Ž . weakly invariant. In this section we show that a weakly invariant solution Ž . for normal form games can be extended uniquely to a weakly invariant solution for strategic form games.
DEFINITION 2. A solution is called weakly in¨ariant if for all triplets
A weakly invariant solution is called in¨ariant if, moreover, for all
Ž . Ž .
D
A solution for normal form games is a map which assigns to each normal ² : form game ⌫ s M, u a collection of closed, nonempty subsets of ⌬ . Ž . We will show that a weakly invariant solution for normal form games Ž . can be extended uniquely to a weakly invariant solution for strategic form games. In the proof we need the following technical result. 
w x Corresponding to x we introduce a normal form game ⌫ x in such a norm w x way that ⌫ is a reduction of ⌫ x . In this new game each player gets norm norm an extra pure strategy, say k for player i. In order to define the payoff i X Ž . Ž function u for the new game, we consider the linear map :
We take u X [ u ( as the payoff function for player i in the new game. 
. . , e s y g W. So, by the invariance of , there exists a
in view of the weak invariance of . The proof is complete if we ª ⌫ is an isomorphism guarantees that our definition of makes sense.
a In order to show that is weakly invariant, let f be a reduction map from the strategic form game ⌫ onto the strategic form game ⌫ X . Using Lemma 2, the weak invariance of implies that
THE INVARIANCE OF NORMAL FORM SOLUTIONS
In this section we will show that a normal form game is the reduction of another one if and only if one of the games arises from the other one by adding convex combinations of pure strategies as new pure strategies. To that purpose, we include these combinations, which can be represented by probability vectors, in a so-called extension set. This extension set is used ² : to construct a reduction map. To be precise, let ⌫ s M, u be an n-person game in normal form.
finite set of strategies. We call the set of vectors P [ D P an extension set i ² X X : for ⌫. For such a set P we introduce the P-extended game ⌫ s M , u , P where M X [ M j K is the disjoint union of the sets M and K . In order
to define the payoff functions of this game, we consider for all i the linear
The payoff function u Obviously, ⌫ is the 3 = 2-bimatrix game given by 
Ž .
Proof. a Suppose that is a weakly invariant solution for normal form games. If P is an extension set for a normal form game ⌫, then ⌫ ª ⌫. Hence,
Ž . Ž . Ž .
P P
by the weak invariance of .
Ž .
b Suppose, conversely, that for any game ⌫ and any extension set P for ⌫, ⌫ s T N T g ⌫ .
Ä 4
P P
Let f be a reduction map from a normal form game ⌫ onto a normal form game ⌫ X . Then by Theorem 2 there is an extension set P for the game ⌫ such that f s and ⌫ X s ⌫ . Hence is weakly invariant because
Ä 4 Ä 4 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
In a similar way a proof can be given for the invariance of a solution. B
